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The article addresses internal and hidden politics of changes in 
bureaucracies by focusing on the introduction and use of policy 
instruments as institutional change without radical or explicit shifts in 
administrative systems. Beneath public administrative reforms, it 
examines the use of “low-proﬁle instruments” characterized by their 
technical and goal-oriented dimension but also by their low visibility 
to external actors due to the high complexity of their commensurating 
purpose and the automaticity of their use. The core case study of the 
paper offers a historical sociology of a technique for calculating the 
growth of the French civil service wage bill from the mid-1960s to the 
2000s. The origins, uses, and institutionalisation of this method in the 
French context are explored to emphasize the important way of 
governing the bureaucracy at times of crisis through automatic, 
unobtrusive, incremental, and low-proﬁle mechanisms. While insisting 
on the salience of techniques for calculating, measuring, classifying, 
and indexing in the contemporary art of government, it also suggests 
the need for observing and explaining “everyday forms of 
retrenchment” in bureaucracies.
A classic primary approach to the study of administrative reforms con-
sists of looking at the historical and collective processes of agenda setting,
negotiation, and institutionalization of constituent public policies. Most
studies in public administration have favored the analysis of public man-
agement reforms (e.g., Christensen and Lægreid 2002; Olsen and Peters
1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000), that is, of active and public policy
changes in bureaucracies (for the French case, Bezes 2002). These domi-
nant approaches have focused on administrative reform decisions that
claim to transform the formal structures and rules of administrative sys-
tems and have mostly looked at what reformers have set up in terms of
explicit programs. However heuristic this method may be, it nevertheless
does not exhaust thinking on the various institutional changes that have
affected bureaucracies for four decades. Although often considering the
scope and limits of administrative reform policies, these perspectives
have downplayed other strategies through which governmental actors
did not build comprehensive reform plans but still tried to regulate the
administrative system and change it by other means. As illustrated in
much of the neoinstitutionalist literature on welfare state reforms and
retrenchment policies, notions such as path-dependence, drifts, conver-
sion, or layering are now beginning to offer a wide range of nuanced
mechanisms for the examination of how institutions are reproduced and
changed at ground level by following diverse, complex roads (Hacker
2005; Pierson 1994; Thelen 2003).
This article addresses those internal changes in bureaucracies and
focuses on the introduction and use of policy instruments as institutional
change without radical or explicit shifts in the administrative system.
Indeed, the tactics of government often rely on instruments—that is, on
the use of limited, goal-oriented, and highly technical devices that have
important policy and institutional consequences but are not widely
publicized, allowing institutional arrangements to remain apparently
unchanged. Complex administrative issues such as devolution, budget-
ary reform, personnel policy, or cutbacks in staff or in civil service wages
often rely on diverse technical decisions and tools. Beneath explicit
administrative reforms, studying the everyday forms of “governing the
bureaucracy” basically involves looking at concrete devices that aim to
collect large amounts of information, to measure (people, credits, expen-
diture, or even performance) and then to set up categories to organize
administrative activities and distribute power, responsibilities, and
money. This broad technical ﬁeld of “instruments to regulate bureau-
cracy” (frames, rates, ratios, indicators, cells, etc.) merits some interest
because of the cognitive and political stakes involved and because instru-
ments constitute an important mode of power.
In this article, I address a very speciﬁc kind of policy instrument, which
I label “low-proﬁle instruments,” and which, in addition to being a tech-
nical, goal-oriented method, characteristically have a discreet dimension,
so that their visibility to external actors is low, as a result of their highly
complex measurement purposes and automatic use. These two properties
make low-proﬁle instruments costly to understand and to manipulate.
They also create strong asymmetries between the top bureaucrats who
develop them as part of their own expertise and the other actors who
suffer from their implementation. We may observe their use in three
different kinds of situations: (1) when the issues at stake remain highly
ambiguous or conﬂictual because of uncertain knowledge about what to
do (here, low-proﬁle instruments are used to provide new strategic infor-
mation and to rationalize a process); (2) when the political context does
not facilitate structural administrative reform because of high political
costs (the use of low-proﬁle instruments here will technicalize and depo-
liticize an issue); (3) when the strongly embedded nature of administra-
tive structures makes them highly resistant to change (low-proﬁle
instruments are used as a policy alternative, to foster new policy aims by
introducing new methods).
The core case study of this article offers, by way of example, a historical
sociology of a technique used to calculate the French civil service wage
bill since the mid-1960s: the RMS (raisonnement en masse salariale). I focus
on the origins, uses, and institutionalization of this method, which mea-
sures growth in civil service wages using a calculation based on the
overall wage bill. Of course, the budgetary issues linked to payment of
wages in the French civil service have always been highly signiﬁcant.
Because of the large number of state employees (2,500,000 in the state civil
service in 1981 and 2,270,000 in 2002), wages form a very major part of
the state’s budget: wages and pensions represented about 35.9% of the
state budget in 1975 and an estimated 40.7% in 2002. These outlays play
a strategic role in two different mechanisms, so measuring and controlling
them represent high stakes. First, the civil service has long served as a
reference point in determining wage rises in public enterprises and in the
private sector. Curbing wage rises in the civil service was therefore crucial
in achieving the deﬂationary objectives of post-1975 governments. Sec-
ond, the internal structural arrangements of the French civil service (a
system organized around the corps—about 1,700 groupings of ofﬁcials
with the same conditions of service, each of which has its own particular
methods of internal management and promotion—and the principle of
separation between rank and job) have, historically, promoted inﬂation-
ary mechanisms because of the wage comparisons and adjustments prac-
ticed between the corps and categories of personnel. Thus, since the mid-
1960s—but more intensively since the 1982 crisis—governments have all
wanted to take action on wage expenditure in the civil service, while
simultaneously seeking to limit the negative effects of unpopular cuts for
a large number of public employees, who were also voters.
In successive sections, the article examines the different uses of this
instrument in four conﬁgurations in order to highlight complementary
dimensions of low-proﬁle instruments as they apply to administrative
states. Invented during the 1960s, in a Keynesian context, as an instru-
ment for providing an objective consensual tool for wage negotiations
with public sector unions, in the 1970s the RMS was transformed into a
low-proﬁle instrument at the service of the Budget Directorate. This cul-
minated in its role in repeated attempts to monitor and reduce civil
service wages expenditure in the context of the French policy of eco-
nomic stringency from 1982 to 1988. Although strongly questioned dur-
ing the 1990s for its limitations or its negative side effects on the French
Civil Service, the RMS is still used as an instrument today, but has been
supplemented by other initiatives. It was also to some extent reborn in
the context of the Institutional Act on Finance Legislation, adopted on
August 1, 2001, which institutionalized the use of the global wage bill
method for measuring, calculating, and ﬁxing salaries for public sector
managers. In the ﬁnal section of the article, I will address three questions
through consideration of the empirical case. First, the design of a highly
technical instrument can be seen as related to the concern to provide new
expert knowledge about public sector salaries; the importance of this
concrete dimension of administrative changes will be discussed. Second,
I will argue that measurement of civil service wages is not merely a
knowledge-oriented issue. Both senior bureaucrats and politicians have
decided to use it as a low-proﬁle means of reducing public expenditure.
I will examine the importance of this politicized use of an instrument in
the process of government, where policy makers value the beneﬁts of
relying on invisible devices in making unpopular decisions on cuts.
Third, this case study allows us to gain a more general understanding of
retrenchment policy on bureaucracies in instances, such as in France,
where initiatives have not primarily radically targeted drastic reforms at
the explicit rules of the administrative system. This work forms part of a
research agenda with stronger interests in complex paths of institutional
transformation than are usually recognized in studies of change in public
administration.
The Keynesian Context: Inventing an Instrument to Calculate the 
French Civil Service Wage Bill
Investigation of State Wages Is Brought into Focus
The investigation of civil service wages in the 1960s does not emerge as
an obvious and immediately legitimate focus for questioning. In fact, it
resulted from three simultaneous dynamics, through which administra-
tion and the wages of state employees became, in a gradual and frag-
mented way, the object of investigations and debates.
As debates about the rationality of the state’s administrative apparatus
proliferated, reﬂexive questioning on the “cost” of the civil service
became an intrinsic part of the general context of the 1960s (Bezes 2003).
The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the opening up of the French
economy to international competition, and the intensiﬁed development
of the national welfare state via the extension of economic planning from
the 4th Plan (1962–1965) onward all promoted an increasing number of
questions about the optimal, rational nature of state interventions and
investments. In this context, three intraministerial centralist institutions—
namely, the Commissariat général au plan (the National Planning Commis-
sion), the Service d’études économiques et ﬁnancières (SEEF—the Economic
and Financial Studies Service), which took over forecasting in 1965, and
the Budget Directorate—sought knowledge and instruments likely to
help them better evaluate and monitor changes in the administrative
state. Both the use of macroeconomic modeling instruments and the con-
cern to rationalize public choices and administrative functioning through
the development of microeconomic (cost–beneﬁt) techniques formed an
integral part of this context.1
The particular attention given to public sector wages in terms of “over-
all cost” then resulted in more speciﬁc questions, which in turn led to
wages and wage movements becoming an object of investigation and a
regulatory issue. In 1961–1962, the Budget Directorate (and, indirectly, the
Civil Service Ministry) observed inﬂationary cascade effects on the
indexed and statutory wage structure of the French civil service. In par-
ticular, in that year, following indexing modiﬁcations for teaching person-
nel, a large number of other categories of staff, whose conditions were in
line with theirs, obtained upratings of their salary scales after claiming
for equal treatment. This general increase led to the perception of anom-
alies in the growth in wages in the early 1960s, between the indexed
increase and the real amount of growth in wages expenditure, as noted
by the Budget Directorate. The general annual increases granted were
lower than the variations in the overall wages bill—that is, in the amount
of wages actually paid. From this period onward, therefore, the Budget
Directorate began to seek instruments that would allow it to reﬁne its
methods of calculating civil service wage increases and to retain, however
precariously, control of the game.
Finally, interest in the issue of civil service wages also stemmed from
debates in the ﬁrst half of the 1960s about the creation of a Keynesian-
inspired incomes policy, in French society generally and—though here
more restrained—in the public sector. In the context of debates about the
4th Plan (1962–1965), two institutions were lobbying at the same time, but
for different reasons, for a national incomes policy (Boissonnat 1966;
Hayward 1966). The Conseil économique et social (Economic and Social
Council), on the one hand, echoed the interest groups represented within
it (farmers and wage earners) in defending the idea of an income redis-
tribution policy intended to combat inequalities within the French popu-
lation. The Commissariat général au Plan, on the other hand, was arguing
in the same direction because it wanted to develop a social incomes policy
within the perspective of the 5th Plan, with two objectives in mind. A
social incomes policy would ﬁrst be intended to moderate wage inﬂation
and make it more predictable, by establishing mechanisms to track
changes in wage structures. It would also aim to redress income dispari-
ties, notably in favor of disadvantaged groups (old people, families with
a lot of children, minimum wage earners, agricultural workers, repatri-
ated people, etc.). Several initiatives (creation of a Statistics and Incomes
Group, Conference on Incomes Policy, many reports) provide evidence
that this topic was on the government’s agenda in the early 1960s.
Although it went on to fail (Hayward 1966), the creation of this public
policy on incomes in the mid-1960s was closely linked to the economic
planning ideal and to the Keynesian economic framework.
In this context, one of the major stakes in making wage discussions
credible was to perfect instruments to enable the planning and tracking
of “growth in the wages bill, broken down into its main elements: growth
in the number of wage-earners, changes in working hours, movements in
wages owing to continuing improvements in qualiﬁcations, movement in
the organizational hierarchy” (Gruson 1964, 556)—in other words, to
ensure the most precise possible tracking of wage developments in French
society. The debates related especially to the inﬂationary effects of wage
increases, likely to occur in three distinct areas: the civil service proper,
public enterprises, and private enterprises. The stakes were raised in
particular by advances in public sector pay following a coalminers’ strike
in the nationalized sector in March 1963. These conﬂicts to some extent
refocused thinking on the case of the public sector. In October 1963, in
reaction to the coal dispute, Jean Toutée, Councilor of State and Chairman
of the Finance Section of the Council of State, was asked by Prime Min-
ister George Pompidou to produce a report on restoring dialogue between
the public sector trade unions and government, and, more speciﬁcally, on
public sector wage negotiation procedures (Task Force on the Improve-
ment of Public Sector Wages Discussion Procedures, the Toutée Report
1964).2 This was the institutional framework in which questions were
raised, in relation to public enterprises, not only about the forms taken
by negotiations between trade unions and government, but also about the
content of discussions and what was at stake in them (Salon 1993, 417–
418). In order to negotiate, it was necessary to be able to determine
precisely the amounts of wages paid (i.e., of the total wages bill) and the
degree of interdependence between the public sector and the civil service,
as well as any knock-on effects.
The Invention of the RMS: Genesis of a Learning Instrument
In fact, the Toutée Task Force (in which the chairman was joined by two
other members of the Council of State) proposed recommendations in
three essential areas. First, the task force advocated a rationalization of
the wage-negotiation procedure in public enterprises. Second, enterprises
were invited to develop forms of short-term or “progress contracts” with
trade unions, guaranteeing wage commitments over a given period in
exchange for a nonstrike agreement. Third, and above all, the Toutée Task
Force stressed the need to stabilize negotiations on the basis of statistical
wages data, which should be precise, reliable, and accepted by all. One
section of the report was devoted to “wage studies” and to the crucial
issue of the credibility of calculations (Task Force on the Improvement of
Public Sector Wages Discussion Procedures, the Toutée Report 1964, 7).
The aim was to establish less questionable bases for wage negotiation
through the creation of a new technical instrument for measuring wage
outlays in public enterprises—one which would enable the whole “wage
bill” to be taken into account. The task force thus revisited the old, formal
way of looking at “wages”: instead of looking at just basic pay and
general increases, it proposed adding the different category increases
peculiar to a corps or a group within the enterprise (creation or increase
of allowances, reclassiﬁcation of some categories, improvements in con-
ditions for promotion, changes in the qualiﬁcations for some jobs) that
increase the overall wages bill. It also suggested adding the “automatic”
wage increases linked to career advancement through length of service
and changes in the technical expertise needed for jobs. As public-sector
employees advance in their careers through length of service, their pay
increases automatically, without any decision to increase wages being
taken. To assess the wage bill exactly from one year to the next also
supposes that two comparable things are being compared; therefore, it is
necessary to determine the wage bill on the basis of unchanged seniority
and technical expertise as well as according to the number of permanent
staff, taking into account the impact on wages of retirement quits (of those
on high wages) and of hiring new employees (on low wages at the bottom
of the scale).
Thus, the Toutée Report was characterized by the ﬁrst fairly systematic
formalization of the various components of the “total wage bill” into what
is known as the RMS, which came to substitute for a calculation based
on level or year-on-year ﬁgures. The cognitive instrument “RMS” was
invented and designed to alter the terms of wage negotiations between
the state and representatives of public sector employees. From May/June
1964, the prime minister’s advisers, including representatives of public
sector management and senior civil servants from the ministries of
Finance, Public Works, Industry, and the Civil Service, met to tackle the
issue of how to transpose the measures envisaged into the context of the
civil service (Salon 1993, 419).
A New Instrument with a New Conception of Civil Service 
Wages Policy?
Several factors show that this was indeed a new way of calculating—a
new way of thinking about administration, with a critical perspective on
the civil service. First, taking into account three components to measure
the overall annual civil service wage bill (general increases, category
increases, and the effects of automatic growth of the wage bill by taking
into account promotion by seniority and changes in technical expertise
requirements3) represented a total challenge to the previous method of
calculating personnel expenditure, which was based on the level of pay,
looking only at ofﬁcial index and wage increases—the general increases—
at a given time, t. Second, the RMS completely altered the philosophy
behind the measurement of wage growth in the French civil service.
Speciﬁcally, it considerably reduced the part played by general increases.
Category increases, variations in workforce numbers (the creation of new
jobs), pay raises according to length of service (the wage bill increases as
the workforce ages), or hiring or promoting more skilled workers (the
wage bill increases if more highly qualiﬁed, and therefore more highly
paid, people are recruited) automatically increase the overall wage bill.
These components are viewed as beneﬁts “really” granted to the staff;
therefore the RMS method takes the view that automatic increases in the
wage bill should be added to any raises granted by government. This new
instrument therefore devalued and delegitimized the importance of gen-
eral wage negotiations between the state and the civil service trade
unions. Lastly, the ﬁndings of the Toutée Report, like those of the 1963
Massé Report (Massé, Bloch-Lainé, and Masselin 1963) and the Incomes
Policy Conference, pointed out the dangers of the knock-on effects
between wage increases in the civil service, the public sector, and the
private sector in the context of the early stages of a counterinﬂationary
policy. The issue of “parity” between sectors became a major preoccupa-
tion because there was a risk of causing inﬂationary adjustments. This
was a challenge to the basic mechanism of double indexation, a union-
sponsored clause in the Law of 3 April 1955, which “invited” the govern-
ment to ensure harmonization and adjustment of status and pay between
the state civil service and public enterprises in the nationalized sector
(where pay was itself indexed to prices). This link between nationalized
industries and the civil service proper created a dependence that tied the
hands of government and favored the arguments and claims of the civil
service trade unions. In 1963, in the context of the overheating economy
of the early 1960s, this linkage was viewed as a problem by the Pompidou
government, although it could not really be challenged then because the
measure was unpopular (Hayward 1966).
In the mid-1960s, these new recommendations for calculating the wage
bill were as yet only proposals. In September 1964, Prime Minister Pom-
pidou tried to use the Toutée procedures in public enterprises and to
extend them to civil service negotiations, on the advice of the Budget
Directorate, but he immediately encountered the hostility of the trade
unions, culminating in a general strike in December 1964. The major
issues at stake were to acquire objective knowledge—to show the scien-
tiﬁc, useful nature of calculations based on the wage bill—and to establish
its credibility. This meant establishing the legitimacy of an instrument
initially thought of as a learning instrument, supposed to be able to reveal
the truth about wages in the state civil service and the public sector.
However, the RMS also represented a shift in the signiﬁcance of wages
control that was not free of ambiguity. The initial orientation was Keyne-
sian: through its idea of an “incomes policy” and its aim of forecasting
and being able to calculate the wage behavior of the agent “state,” it
reafﬁrmed the Keynesian ideal of overall, interdependent economic
approaches in the context of extending economic planning and macroeco-
nomic perspectives. The RMS was designed as the instrument of a policy
of consultation between government and trade unions, linked to eco-
nomic planning and intended to “frame” and reduce inﬂationary logics
while defending the idea of the autonomy of public enterprises.4 How-
ever, calculating the wage bill in this way was also a microeconomic
exercise, perceived by some as an amendment to Keynesianism but by
others as evidence of the emergence of another economic—neoclassical
or neoliberal—paradigm within a Keynesian framework. This suggests
the idea that a Keynesian macroeconomy and a liberal microeconomy
coexisted during the 1960s (Favereau 1982). From the 1960s onward,
administrative and political elites started to consider that the contempo-
rary exercise of state government should now involve the implementation
of an economy within its civil service—that is, a scientiﬁc approach to
knowledge about numbers, costs, and growth of the administrative
workforce.
Throughout the 1960s, the development of the RMS was therefore
structured by three distinct and contradictory objectives: it was an
invented learning instrument, intended to assess precisely a previously
uncertain aggregate (the pay of public employees); yet it was also envis-
aged as an instrument of embryonic free-market policy because it was
linked to anti-inﬂationary objectives by its function in moderating public
sector pay rises; ﬁnally, it was an instrument of social dialogue because
it was supposed to provide credibility and statistical bases for procedures
of consultation and negotiation between government and trade unions.
Although it was already beginning to be mobilized by the public author-
ities to evaluate wage growth (and particularly by the Budget Directorate
for the civil service) and to assess developments, it was not used in
negotiations and was clearly rejected by trade-union actors.
From the Late 1960s to the Early 1980s: Learning Instrument 
Transformed into Low-Proﬁle Wage Control Instrument
The changes made to the instrument and its uses from the late 1960s to
the 1970s relate to the way in which the three objectives that initially
deﬁned it evolved. During the period 1966 to 1976, the signiﬁcant factor
was the repeated failure of numerous attempts to implement a true
incomes policy. Although the function of the RMS as a learning instru-
ment was never called into question, the contrasting failures of its other
use—in the service of social dialogue—to some extent “forced it back”
into the role of a discretionary, asymmetrical budgeting instrument, used
only by the Budget Directorate. This appropriation by the Budget Direc-
torate, in the context of the economic crisis of the 1970s, exacerbated
conﬂicts with the civil service trade unions around the credibility of the
RMS as instrument.
The Failures of Incomes Policy and Its Effects: The Changing Use 
of an Instrument
From the mid-1960s onward, incomes policy was contested and rejected
by the public-sector trade unions. The economic recession in 1965, the
maintenance of the Stabilization Plan, which constrained prices and
wages, and increasing pay disparities all fed the hostility of trade unions,
which saw incomes policy as an instrument of the “wages police.” From
1966 to 1968, the civil service trade unions were no longer associated with
a policy of social dialogue. The May–June 1968 negotiations, followed by
the arrival in ofﬁce of Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas in 1969,
brought about a renewal of collective bargaining and incomes policy, but
this did not last. A visible sign was the ﬁrst wage agreement in the civil
service, concluded in 1970 in the form of a “joint statement,” that is, a text
not formally signed by the parties. This inauguration of wage agreements
between the state and the civil service trade unions led to a practice that
still existed in 2004. This renewed relationship was, however, of little
signiﬁcance: in July 1972, the fall of Jacques Chaban-Delmas spelled the
end for the policy of social dialogue in its institutional form.
With the failure of incomes policy, the RMS lost for good its initial
“democratic” justiﬁcation—that is, to be a credible learning instrument,
accepted in negotiations. The failure of the public policy that had carried
it forward reduced it to a mere method of calculation, facilitating the
construction of economic and budgetary data and conﬁned solely to use
by the Budget Directorate. In the mid-1970s, the stated use of the RMS
changed its meaning. Such calculations were established above all as a
highly useful instrument for discovering the wage outlays of the state, at
the discretion of the government and the Budget Directorate, which had
been in command of creating them. In fact, these institutional actors ﬁxed
the terms of wage negotiations with the civil service trade unions; and
the RMS, with its aura of statistics and its starting point in stating the
“objective” amount of growth in the wage bill, enabled them to justify
their choices. The RMS gradually became a strategic instrument for bud-
getary management of administration, at the discretion of the public
authorities, which used it unilaterally. From the 1970s onward, the trade
unions, placed in a dilemma, viewed it as illegitimate. They had to do
their best to gain technical mastery of the pay calculations carried out,
but at the same time they complained about an instrument whose use
was not subject to any consultation. From this point of view, the economic
crisis of the 1970s only accentuated the asymmetry and division between
trade unions and public authorities.
The Economic Crisis of the 1970s: The RMS Becomes a Low-Proﬁle 
Instrument at the Service of the Budget Directorate
In 1975, the appearance of a budget deﬁcit for the consolidated accounts
of the public administrations (state, social security, and local authorities),
as well as for the state itself, represented a fundamental challenge to forms
of public policy and to the beliefs attached to it. The economic policy put
forward by Prime Minister Raymond Barre in September 1976 broke with
Keynesianism and set monetarist-inspired objectives: an anti-inﬂation
policy (which became a priority and the ﬁrst stage in an antiunemploy-
ment strategy), decontrol of prices, a policy to promote the strong franc
in the context of the European Monetary System (EMS), and restriction
in the growth of the money supply. With the new objectives of maintain-
ing the balance of public accounts, state outlays constituted the object of
numerous examinations, in which spending on staff (wages and pensions)
was an essential element. The fact that these outlays represented a high
and growing share of the state budget was denounced, as was the fact
that they could not be easily reduced. From 1972 onward, they grew
constantly, from 34.4% of the state budget to 38.9% in 1976.5 From 1976,
wages expenditure became an object of budgetary intervention for the
Budget Directorate.
Thus, the economic crisis of the 1970s made the RMS a central instru-
ment in any budgetary action on administration. There were two major
reasons for intensiﬁcation of its use. The ﬁrst was that this form of calcu-
lation lay at the heart of the Barre government’s objectives. From 1976,
the government’s strategy was to moderate wage increases with the help
of a policy known as “gradualism,” intended to gradually diminish inﬂa-
tionary trends. It was based on decremental rates of price and wage
increases, and was applied particularly to the civil service. The govern-
ment’s stated objective was to restrict the degree to which purchasing
power for public employees would be maintained through the guarantee
of the state’s wage bill growing at the same rate as the gross domestic
product (GDP). Publicly acknowledged reference ﬁgures (prices, GDP,
wages) thus became signiﬁcant stakes in the game, and were often “mas-
saged” downward by government in order to minimize rising claims,
even if this meant later facing demands for readjustment. In this context,
ﬁxing the rate of public-sector wage increases and, more speciﬁcally still,
ﬁxing the annual increase in the wage bill, were crucial issues in ﬁnancial
management of the French economy. From 1978 to 1981, the budget direc-
tor placed preventing unexpected excess and moderating wages in the
civil service at the heart of his objectives, because of the driver effects this
would have on the private sector. The second reason that led to more
intensive use of the RMS relates to the political situation of the Barre
government. From 1976 to 1981, its actions were politically constrained,
notably in its interventions in administration. The electoral context was
not very favorable to radical public policies. The meager partisan
resources of President Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s party, the Républicains
Indépendants, the demanding conditions of political competition after 1974
(numerous elections: district in 1976; municipal in 1977, largely won by
the Left; a general election in 1978; European elections in 1979) and inter-
nal divisions in the right-wing majority (particularly in parliament, where
they were deepened by the creation of a new Gaullist party, the Rassem-
blement pour la République) led to the prevalence of consensual measures
from 1977 to 1981 and to the avoidance of any measures that would
clearly bring the majority camps into conﬂict. Signiﬁcantly, from 1976,
economic policies (the Plans Barre) remained moderate in their monetary
objectives (Cohen, Galbraith, and Zysman 1982).6 In this conﬁguration,
the political actors did not seek to propose structural reforms in admin-
istration or to publicize a restrictive policy toward civil servants. On the
contrary, they wanted to minimize the visibility of cuts in the wages of
state employees (Pierson 1994) in order to develop a blame-avoidance
strategy (Weaver 1986).
In this context, the RMS represented an ideal low-proﬁle instrument
for use in budgetary control of stafﬁng costs. It offered privileged infor-
mation for calculating growth in the annual amount of state wages expen-
diture and allowed inﬂuence over the content of wage negotiations with
the civil service trade unions. In wage negotiations, the Budget Director-
ate relied on the technical nature and complexity of the instrument to
claim that the ﬁgures it provided were objective and to impose them on
the other actors. The method of calculation—complicated, much debated,
and fully perfected in the 1970s, favored the development of the tactics
of obfuscation described by Paul Pierson (Pierson 1994): they made it
difﬁcult to calculate the amount to be negotiated and enabled the impo-
sition of losses on one social group (civil servants) at minimal political
cost. In the internal work of the Budget Directorate,7 the overall rate of
annual increase in the wage bill was calculated using the RMS and broken
down into its different variables. The proportions attributable to category
increases, career advancement, entries and exits, and increasing technical
expertise were calculated by applying the RMS within the restricted
framework of the Budget Directorate, and then used to offer the trade
unions a limited increase in the value of the civil service salary point
during annual civil-service negotiations. In addition, while identifying
and seeking to measure the various components of wages bill growth, the
Budget Directorate actually slightly uprated the proportion of these
increases attributed to category increases and to automatic increases
linked to length of service, reskilling, and staff movements. Thus, these
calculations constantly made the inﬂuence of general increases somewhat
more relative, even though they were the only component ofﬁcially nego-
tiated during annual meetings between the state and the civil service
trade unions. The use of the RMS equation—“PI = WBI = GI + CI +
GVT”8—held full sway at the Budget Directorate, where it gradually
acquired the credibility of a strategic tool for calculations intended to
realize new objectives. This analysis of successive wage negotiations over
the period clearly demonstrates that civil servants’ purchasing power
increased much less after 1976 (3.8% in 1977 as against 6.4% in 1976), to
the point where the 1981 increase was just 1.3%.
Ideally, the Budget Directorate would have liked the trade unions to
accept the RMS. It would then have been able to base wage discussions,
from the outset, on objective ﬁgures that were necessarily more
restrained than traditional trade union claims for adjustments in line
with inﬂation through uprating of the civil service salary point. By the
mid-1970s, however, the low-proﬁle use of the RMS was already struc-
turing strong conﬂict between the Budget Directorate and the civil ser-
vice unions.
The Public Illegitimacy of a Low-Proﬁle Instrument: The 1977 
Conﬂict Finds the Budget Directorate and the Civil Service Trade 
Unions in Opposition
The year 1977 offers a good illustration of the conﬂict that brought trade
unions and government into opposition over civil service wages (Bran-
ciard 1995). In 1977, the government—especially the Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Finance and the Budget Directorate—wanted to
transform the public terms of wage negotiations by imposing the RMS as
the basis for the calculations used in discussions. They wanted the unions
to agree publicly that they would formulate claims for general increases
on the basis of wage bill calculations (and no longer on the basis of year-
on-year level).9 In 1977, in a period of galloping inﬂation, the indexation
of wages to prices was judged problematic because it was effectively a
mechanism for maintaining inﬂationary pressure, in a French context
where civil service negotiations acted as a reference point for pay raises
in public enterprises and the private sector. A radical decision to deindex
could have been a solution that might nullify the driver effects: this
change had been under study by the Forecasting Directorate (Direction de
la prévision), but even though its technical feasibility was accepted, it
could not be envisaged economically or—above all—politically. The mea-
sure was judged too unpopular to be taken on by the Barre government.
In the absence of deindexation, it was vital to control the negotiated
amount of any salary upratings. On the advice of the Budget Directorate,
the government therefore sought to alter the way increases were calcu-
lated by requiring the other side in the negotiations to use more precise
ﬁgures, which better reﬂected the real amounts involved.10 It was clearly
a matter of imposing the RMS as an essential frameworking element of a
civil service wage control policy.
This use of the instrument and the government’s attempt to impose it
as an ofﬁcial measure were immediately denounced by the trade unions,
who refused to accord it any scientiﬁc, objective value. The protest led to
a public conﬂict between government and unions, who broke off the
negotiations for good in September 1977. There was no wage agreement
in 1977, for the ﬁrst and only time from 1972 to 1983 inclusive. Thus, the
civil service trade unions, in a context of frameworked negotiation, exer-
cised a power of challenge and from then on played the role of “veto
actors” (Tsebelis 2002). In a sensitive economic and political context, civil
service wage decisions were a crucial sign, given what was at stake
ﬁnancially and politically. At a time when political support within the
majority could not be taken for granted, nonsignature of the 1977 wage
agreement was a bad sign politically. For the 1978 negotiations, the
government took a step back and ofﬁcially readopted a formula using
year-on-year level. The RMS remained the Budget Directorate’s favored
instrument of calculation, but it was not the agreed instrument for wage
discussions.
Although the RMS had been invented to make it credible to establish
a Keynesian incomes policy, the instrument was then strategically reap-
propriated in the second half of the 1970s, so that it appeared, in ﬁne, as
simply a low-proﬁle instrument of the Budget Directorate. As such, it lost
any legitimacy in its initial role as a learning instrument supposed to
guarantee collective agreements on wages and make them credible. This
is proved by multiple challenges from trade unions, which called into
question the method of calculating the wage bill and also the INSEE
[Institut National de Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques] prices index
(Branciard 1995, 40). Above all, they provide evidence that the Budget
Directorate, although it did not stop using calculations based on the wage
bill, did not succeed in making the RMS a credible public instrument of
negotiation. The low-proﬁle, discretionary nature of the use of the RMS
was sustained.
The pattern of events in the 1970s therefore ensured paradoxical suc-
cess for the RMS. The informational advantage that it offered to the
Budget Directorate highlights its transformation into a one-way instru-
ment, while the complexity of its calculation method favored strategic
manipulation. In this sense, the public administration personnel expen-
diture policy followed from 1974 to 1981 reﬂected this use, as well as
structuring the Barre government’s attempt to slow the increase in the
public sector wage bill by limiting its growth to the rate of GDP and by
strictly maintaining its purchasing power.
The Institutionalization of the RMS as a Low-Proﬁle 
Spending Control Instrument
Stronger Interest in Controlling the Civil Service Wage Bill: Economic 
Dynamics but Political Constraints
After the ﬁrst phase of economic revival led by the Socialist–Communist
coalition government, the worsening public accounts situation from June
1982 to 1984 (increased budget expenditures, low growth in GDP, rise in
public deﬁcits, and in-state debt) led to an abrupt turn in economic policy
(Cameron 1996; Fonteneau and Muet 1985). Following three successive
devaluations (October 4, 1981, June 12, 1982, and March 21, 1983), the
failure of Keynesian reﬂation was diagnosed. At the cost of arbitration
between political and administrative élites, the government of Prime Min-
ister Pierre Mauroy set in motion the turn to economic stringency. This
led a certain number of actors (notably, members of the Treasury Direc-
torate) to recommend the reversal of the policy mix: it was expressed in
the abandonment of a large part of the measures set in motion in 1981
(the Keynesian-inspired reﬂationary policy) and in the appropriation of
objectives close to those pursued by the Barre government—refusal to
devalue, maintaining the strong franc, and countering inﬂation through
economic stringency measures (reducing demand and public spending).
From now on, the battle against inﬂation and the policy of economic
stringency were to go hand-in-hand. This change in the nature of eco-
nomic policy made the policy of reducing public spending11 and its trans-
lation into the state’s personnel expenditure even more pressing.
In fact, the development of macroeconomic priorities lent strong legit-
imacy to measures to control and reduce the main budget items (running
costs, staff, and wages). State personnel expenditure (pay—thus, both
wages and stafﬁng levels) represented a high proportion of the structure
of the state budget—in 1983, 35.9% of state expenditure. In the early 1980s,
its importance was even greater, because civil service wage increases still
served as a reference point for general wages policy and had inﬂationary
effects on public enterprises and the private sector. Indexation of the civil
service salary point to growth in prices accentuated this effect. State
personnel expenditure therefore became increasingly a target because
mastering it was at the center of a dual logic: reducing state expenditure
both to control deﬁcits and to combat inﬂation. Action on state wages
became unavoidable and legitimate. At the Budget Directorate, deindex-
ing wages in order to break the inﬂationary wage–price spiral was a
priority in the context of a crisis in public ﬁnances. Determining the wage
increase to be negotiated with the civil service trade unions therefore
acquired considerable importance, expressed by senior civil servants at
the directorate in terms of a crusade.
However, renewed attention to state personnel expenditure at this
period came up against a major stumbling block. The political commit-
ments of May 1981 remained solid and could not be challenged abruptly
because there was a Socialist–Communist coalition government. Simi-
larly, from 1981 onward, public policies initiated in the sphere of admin-
istration had objectives that ran counter to the embryonic policy of
economic stringency (decentralization, extending and rationalizing the
Civil Service Act and Regulations, strengthening public sector employ-
ment). Budgetary policy therefore had to operate—along with others—in
the context of a deﬁned set of previous public interventions in the admin-
istrative sphere, which were far from convergent. Reﬂationary economic
policy, initially adopted by the Mauroy government to combat unemploy-
ment, and civil service policy, spearheaded by the Communist Civil
Service Minister, were both favorable to public sector employees and
beneﬁted from strong coalitions of support. From 1982 to 1984, reversing
priorities favorable to public sector employees constituted a political
dilemma. The Socialist Party, in particular, was faced with a dilemma:
sacriﬁce the political identity it had gained from the 1981 presidential
election, in order to form new support, or oppose the groups pleading
from within its ranks for a more liberal policy to combat ﬁnancial imbal-
ances while favoring the middle classes electorally. In 1982–1983, and
again in 1984, the Mauroy government and then the Fabius government
could not radically claim the credit for a monetarist turn and publicly
abandon their previous commitments. The frequency of elections (presi-
dential elections in May 1981 and 1988, a general election in March 1986,
district elections in March 1982, and municipal ones in March 1983) lent
a certain rhythm to the display of economic stringency measures. There-
fore, this context validated budgetary strategies that allowed the reduc-
tion of state personnel expenditures and the limitation of increases in
them, by minimizing political costs. The RMS, an instrument already
under the mastery of the Budget Directorate and in use as a strategic
calculation tool, then attracted renewed interest and acquired a usefulness
and legitimacy that it did not have in the 1970s.
Mastery of the RMS by the Budget Directorate: Competence 
Validated
Failing broad political support, and in a context of redoubled crisis in
1982–1983, the Budget Directorate favored the instruments that it had
available and knew how to manipulate for more long-term investments
and strategies. In path-dependence terms, the view could be taken that
the costs of investing in low-proﬁle methods (and notably in research into
calculating the wage bill) and the learning costs of the wage calculation
instrument encouraged the Budget Directorate to pursue the strategy
under way since the second half of the 1970s. We know that knowledge
and know-how are acquired in the complex production processes by
which an institution invests in “solutions,” because they allow it to fulﬁll
the objectives it is responsible for, as well as to respond to the “problems”
and constraints it encounters. From 1982 and after the failure of structural
reform, such as the Rationalisation des choix budgétaires in the 1970s, the
Budget Directorate intensiﬁed the use of low-proﬁle methods, which
enabled budgetary savings to be made and wage claims to be moderated
without recourse to provocative public announcements or to reorganiza-
tions with hazardous outcomes. Even other budgetary and managerial
instruments (ﬁxing targets and expenditure ceilings, procedures to pre-
vent new expenditures without new receipts, “prioritization” programs
and programs to establish planning and evaluation instruments) used at
the same period in other states (Schick 1986, 1988) were not mobilized.
The strategy validated in France relied above all on existing know-how
and its properties, notably the asymmetry of information between the
Budget Directorate and the sectoral ministries.
Against this backdrop, with the technical nature of the instruments—
as well as their low proﬁle—at stake, senior civil servants from the Bud-
get Directorate (Bureau 1-A, in charge of budgetary reporting, and espe-
cially Bureaus 2-A and 2-B in charge of wages and conditions) played a
sensitive role. Top bureaucrats in these ofﬁces were the people who had
to translate the political objectives adopted (the turn to economic strin-
gency) into technical measures. These were specialists in the service of
the political, bearers of precise technical solutions, which they proposed
and then did their best to have adopted by the political actors, regardless
of who held political power. From 1982 to 1988, the Budget Directorate
was an inﬂuential breeding ground and a site of socialization for the
requirements of budgets implemented during the period, favoring an
emphasis on the exercise of budgetary control over ministries and out-
lays. Specializing in costing policies on civil service wages, stafﬁng levels
and conditions, the second vice-directorate in charge of the civil service
(Bureaus 2-A and 2-B) played the most determining role in analyzing the
mysteries of civil service wages and stafﬁng policy from 1980 to 1990. Its
team of senior civil servants reﬁned, rationalized, and perfected an
instrument for calculating the wage bill, then pleaded the case for impos-
ing it on trade unions in wage negotiations. In the period 1983–1988,
Bureau 2-A beneﬁted from the constant support of other, more generalist,
and more politicized members of the Budget Directorate, who defended
the proposed technical solutions, took them up and expressed them
politically. Starting in 1983, especially from 1984 to 1986, and then from
1986 to 1988, linked groups of senior technocrats and of those occupying
political positions in ministerial cabinets constituted a network of actors,
who were in a position to formulate restrictive budgetary objectives for
public spending and for expenditure on administration, and then to
impose their concrete expression in the form of technical instruments.
Thus, in a context weakened from 1982 onward, the Budget Directorate
was the administrative agent for measures of economic stringency
defended by the governments of Prime Ministers Pierre Mauroy (1981–
1984) and then Laurent Fabius (1984–1986). It made the RMS one of its
favored instruments in the policy of economic stringency and the battle
against inﬂation. The status of the Budget Directorate’s use of the RMS
was thus modiﬁed: in the 1970s, it was an instrument for calculations to
minimize wage increases, but in the 1980s, it became a technique for
regulating wage negotiations.
Incremental, but Cumulatively Efﬁcient, Use of the RMS: A “Virus” 
Strategy for a “Low-Proﬁle” Instrument
In his analysis of welfare state reform policies, Paul Pierson stresses the
importance of strategies for minimizing political costs and, among other
things, the role of tactics that employ obfuscation or dissimulation (Pier-
son 1994, 19–22). Several of these (increasing complexity, decrementalism,
even making cuts automatically) characterized the way the RMS was used
in the 1980s. In fact, the Mauroy and the Fabius governments wanted to
act on civil service expenditure, but still sought to avoid shouldering the
blame for an unpopular policy of economic stringency. The Budget Direc-
torate then offered the technical expertise that aimed to lessen the visibil-
ity of the negative consequences of a reduction in public wage increases.
It established an incremental strategy that allowed the intensiﬁcation of
the use of the wages instrument. This “virus strategy” (Palier 2002) ini-
tially introduced the RMS in a very limited way and so was not perceived
as a profound change, but it went on to be developed step by step and
lead to greater cutbacks.
The use of the RMS as an instrument in the civil service was triggered
by the 1982 price and wage freeze, introduced by Jacques Delors, Minister
of the Economy, and his team to accompany the second devaluation in
June of that year: this lasted four months, from June to October 31. It
aimed to break the vicious circle of price and wage rises, in the objective
of breaking down “expectations of continued inﬂation” (Fonteneau and
Muet 1985, 308). At the end of the freeze, a means had to be found to
prolong the effects of the measure through the implementation of a true
deindexation policy. Processes for determining public sector wages were
at the heart of the action taken by the second vice-directorate within the
Budget Directorate. This was developed incrementally in four stages,
from 1982 to 1986,12 and imposed the intensive use of the RMS in wage
negotiations.
The ﬁrst stage was structured by the establishment of programmed
wage movements in the public sector (civil service and nationalized
industries), based on inﬂation-related objectives ﬁxed a priori by the
government. Under the agreement of March 10, 1982, relating to the
increase  for  the  second  half  of  that  year,  there  was  a  break  with
the conventional system of aligning the rate of combined public sector
pay rises with the rate of combined price rises at the end of each quarter
of the calendar year, on a “sliding scale.” For the second half-year, the
Report of Conclusions provided that uprating would take place according
to “preset” rates, as a function of the government’s price growth objec-
tives. The text provided for a September 1 clause adjusting the respective
growth of prices and pay in the ﬁrst half-year, as well as a January 1, 1983
safeguard clause. There was no longer any systematic annual alignment,
but a ﬁxed-date alignment. The second Budget vice-directorate took
responsibility for putting the agreements into practice, and thus gave
itself the possibility of spacing out the dates of public sector wage re-
evaluations while providing for later meetings (safeguard or review
clauses) to examine the concrete situation of employees’ purchasing
power. This was the new ofﬁcial basis of the deindexing process, criticized
by the trade unions but imposed by the Budget Directorate in a favorable
political and economic context.
The second stage in the use of the wages instrument imposed changes
in ways of measuring wage increases for calculating civil servants’ pur-
chasing power during negotiations with trade unions. Under the agree-
ment of November 22, 1982, the system of preset increases was
institutionalized and “negotiated” in exchange for guarantees in the form
of safeguard (or review) clauses—clauses providing for later meetings
between state and trade unions to examine the concrete situation of
employees’ purchasing power. At stake in the way these clauses were
worded was the imposition of the RMS as the ofﬁcial method of calcula-
tion. Making use of the asymmetry of information in its favor and its
mastery of techniques, the Budget Directorate imposed a calculation
based on the wage bill as a reference tool for measuring wage growth. In
the course of just one year, indexation of wages to prices had had its day
and been replaced by two new low-proﬁle instruments: a system of preset
increases and the assessment of purchasing power on the basis of the
wage bill.
The third phase in the imposition of the RMS took place early in 1984.
Having imposed the RMS as a wage negotiation instrument in relation to
public enterprises and the civil service, the Budget Directorate manipu-
lated its terms by determining the amount of the increase variable linked
to Glissement Vieillesse Technicité (GVT) to be used in calculating the
growth in public employees’ purchasing power. The Prime Minister’s
Wage Circular of January 1984, written by Bureau 2-A, apart from pro-
gramming wage growth according to the government’s inﬂation target,
provided for the situation to be assessed in terms of the wages bill. It
speciﬁed that the maintenance of purchasing power would be measured
in relation not only to average increase in prices but also to three vari-
ables: the “carryover effect” (corresponding to the part of the wage
increase that results from general upratings the year before, estimated at
5.61% in 1984); the effect of category increases (evaluated at 0.36%); and
the effect of GVT (ﬁxed at 0.5% inclusive). The intellectual frameworks
for determining purchasing power were therefore explicit: the effect of
general increases (GI), the effect of category increases (CI), and the effect
of individual increases corresponding to GVT and taking into account
automatic wage growth caused by promotions in rank by seniority.
These frameworks for negotiation were presented as nonnegotiable ele-
ments by the Budget Directorate. The ofﬁcial introduction of GVT into
the calculation of the wage bill was imposed incrementally by initially
ﬁxing an “inclusive” rate of GVT (0.5%). Taking into account the real
value of GVT could have prevented negotiations going ahead because
the amount of the automatic increase in the wage bill caused by the GVT
effect would have covered the whole price increase. However, the essen-
tial result was established: the civil service salary point rose less quickly
than prices, and a seemingly signiﬁcant inﬂationary mechanism—the
automatic readjustment of the civil service point year-on-year in order to
take into account soaring prices—was broken. By introducing the GVT
and carryover effects and by bringing category increases into the calcula-
tion, the Budget Directorate imposed an automatic increase mechanism
that proportionally diminished the part open to negotiation with the
trade unions: the general increases and the value of the “civil service
salary point.” It therefore restrained the amount that could be obtained
through annual wage negotiations. The trade unions refused to accept
these new bases for calculation, and no agreement was negotiated in
1984. However, this change in the method of calculating the growth in
civil servants’ purchasing power was the lever for deindexation, and it
applied to all three branches of the civil service (central, or state, admin-
istration; local government; the health service), as well as to public
enterprises.
In the fourth stage, which lasted beyond the end of 1985 into 1986,
under the government of Prime Minister Jacques Chirac (1986–1988), the
RMS instrument was used more intensively: this increased its deﬂation-
ary effect and further reduced the amount of negotiable general increases.
There were two reasons for new manipulations of the instrument, relating
to a concern to rationalize the method of calculating the wage bill and to
the political strategy of using GVT.
Firstly, GVT was manipulated because of the Budget Directorate’s
concern to perfect the instrument so as to establish ﬁgures that were
indisputable and therefore still more legitimate in negotiations. There
were numerous disagreements between state bodies—Budget Director-
ate, INSEE, and CERC [Centre d’Etudes sur les Revenus et les Coûts]—
about assessment of the wage bill in public enterprises and in the civil
service, notably because the method of calculation still remained largely
uncertain and depended on sources of information (pay slips, aggre-
gated data on wages), over which the various institutions had differing
levels of command (Daniel 1992). The issue of wage bill comparability
between public enterprises, the civil service, and the private sector was
at stake in a context where the knock-on effects—generally from the
public sector onto the private—were great, and so constituted a decisive
mechanism in the battle against inﬂation. In 1985, differences and
“anomalies” rose up between ﬁgures from the Budget Directorate,
INSEE, and CERC, and ﬁerce conﬂict led the Budget Directorate to
change its method of calculating GVT, from 1986 onward, to achieve a
still more “objective” basis. At the end of 1985 and, especially in 1986,
Bureau 2-A pleaded the case for an approach that calculated the “bill
for the present workforce,” removing the effects of departure and
recruitment on the wage bill. At the end of 1985, the Budget Directorate
suggested that the use of GVT would no longer be based on the “GVT
balance,” a relatively moderate amount that takes into account struc-
tural variations in the population studied, but by looking at growth in
the average pay of personnel in post over the period under consider-
ation, combining general and category increases with “positive GVT”
alone.13 Positive GVT (the rate for present workforce numbers) corre-
sponded to a wage bill higher than the GVT balance (the rate for per-
manent workforce numbers). Because it was more stable, this basis for
calculation was judged more reliable by the senior civil servants of
Bureau 2-A.14 At the same time, it was also even more restrictive
because it took into account only positive GVT and no longer made its
impact relative to the negative effects of entries and exits. By increasing
the proportion of GVT used in determining growth in the wage bill, the
authorities made a commensurate reduction in the part negotiable with
the trade unions, that is, increases in the civil service salary point, or
general increases.
Second, and consequently, manipulating GVT raised not only the
learning stakes but also the strategic and political stakes. The advent of a
right-wing government in 1986, making the battle against the public
deﬁcit a priority and involving a discourse critical of state and adminis-
tration, offered new opportunities to the Budget Directorate to place even
further constraints on wage negotiations. According to the economic
advisers, the prime minister “totally delegated” everything relating to
ﬁrming up the policy of economic stringency and the necessary budgetary
arbitrations to the Ministers for Economic Affairs, Finance and the Budget
(Elgie 1993, 81–89), so that he would not be held directly responsible for
an unpopular policy of cuts. Apart from the privatizations and the signif-
icant reduction in sectoral subsidies and intervention spending, the
administration was equally concerned with an increased effort on wages
policy and an effort to limit civil service workforce numbers. The budget
minister’s private ofﬁce and the Budget Directorate were given carte
blanche for the mini budget of 1986, as well as in discussions of the draft
budget for 1987 (Elgie 1993, 113–121). The second vice-directorate of the
Budget Directorate proposed reemphasizing the use of the instruments
established in 1983. First, a civil service wage freeze was declared for 1986.
For 1987, the new director of the second vice-directorate—the former
head of Bureau 2-A—succeeded in imposing a shift from the use of inclu-
sive GVT balance to positive GVT alone, which increased the automatic
rise in the purchasing power of civil servants even further and reduced
proportionally the part negotiable within the general increases. In May
1986, a circular from the Budget Minister on public enterprises deﬁni-
tively imposed the positive GVT and sought a Trojan horse to do the same
in the civil service. This rate was estimated between 1.6% and 1.8%, while
GVT balance was ﬁxed at 0.5% on an inclusive basis. The change in GVT
was argued and justiﬁed by the requirement to calculate a public
employee’s purchasing power on a stable, pure basis—that is, by consid-
ering only employees present from one year to the next.15 The advent of
a new government and its ﬂagging-up of neoliberal objectives thus
enabled further incremental modiﬁcations to the RMS and the manipula-
tion of a variable to justify a wage freeze by showing that public employ-
ees’ purchasing power had increased automatically, well beyond inﬂation
(4%), under the effect of GVT.
Throughout the whole period (1982–1988), the effects of the restrictive
policy on wages and the purchasing power of civil servants were clearly
visible. The budgetary effects of using the RMS were considerable, even
though it remains difﬁcult to evaluate the amount. Estimated by the team
from Bureau 2-A at 60,000,000,000 francs from 1982 to 1988, the budgetary
savings made by applying the RMS were estimated at 72,000,000,000
francs from 1983 to 1992 by the economist Jean-Marc Daniel in his article
on the state’s wage policy (Daniel 1992). Over the period 1981 to 1988,
annual growth in spending on pay and pension costs for the state slowed
substantially: 15.4% in 1982, it was no more than 9.6% in 1983 and 4.5%
in 1985, reaching −0.1% in 1987, then 3.7% in 1988.16 Very signiﬁcantly,
too, personnel expenditure as a proportion of the state budget diminished
between 1980 and 1988: it was 38.7% in 1980, then 35.9% in 1983, stabiliz-
ing at 36.3% in 1988. Similarly, the state’s wage bill as a proportion of GDP
went from 6.14% in 1977 to 6.26% in 1983, then in 1990 fell to 5.24%
(Daniel 1992, 78–79)—the level it was at before the crisis (having been
5.2% in 1967). Civil service expenditure growth was ﬁrst slowed down by
the wage (and price) freeze of June 1982, in the context of the battle against
inﬂation. The creation of budget-funded jobs was also signiﬁcantly
reduced (41,000 new budget-funded jobs in 1982, 12,400 in 1983, then
7,000 in 1984). Thus, the state’s wage bill contracted markedly throughout
the 1980s. As a result of the decremental approach imposed by the Budget
Directorate, civil servants’ purchasing power gains (wage increases in
relation to inﬂation) were considerably reduced in the 1980s: the auto-
matic increases linked to GVT were increasingly taken into account, as
were, to a lesser extent, the category measures that applied to one group
or another in the civil service. Purchasing power gains from general
increases (the increased value of the civil service salary point) strongly
diminished from 2.6% in 1975 to −1.1% in 1979, −0.7% in 1984, and −1.7%
in 1987. This means that purchasing power gains came discreetly from
category measures that apply to some speciﬁc groups within the civil
service (evaluated at around 0.4% in the 1980s). But, most of all, purchas-
ing power gains were considered by the Budget Directorate as resulting
from mechanical effects linked to GVT: they went from 3.9 in 1979 to 1.7
in 1983 and 1.2 in 1985, reaching 0.6 in 1987. Linked to general increases,
they no longer allowed compensation for inﬂation.
Although it is difﬁcult to estimate how civil service wages would have
evolved in the absence of the RMS instrument, budgetary effects on sal-
aries showed that economic stringency and changes in civil service wages
policy were strongly implemented in the French context, but via discreet
paths and without radical political commitments or formal structural
reforms. In this regard, the intensiﬁed use of the RMS is emblematic of
the kind of tactics analyzed by Pierson or described by Palier (2002) as
“virus strategy.” In the 1970s and—even more so—from 1982 to 1986, the
instrument had been used as a low-proﬁle tool to impose wage discipline
in the context of the policy of austerity. It allowed politicians and func-
tionally politicized bureaucrats to save their political capital for other
battles and other unpopular policies.
The Effects of Instrument-Dependency: Limitations 
and Possible Rebirth
The institutionalization of GVT illustrates the new appropriation and the
success of a budgetary instrument that is both a cognitive instrument for
acquiring knowledge and a political and strategic tool. However, its “suc-
cess” remained precarious and dependent on the political and institu-
tional conﬁguration that conferred meaning on it—or did not. From the
early 1990s until the present day, the instrument has lost part of its efﬁ-
ciency as it has lost its low-proﬁle dimension. It has also been constantly
challenged by the civil service trade unions. Consequently, new strategies
have recently emerged, adopting new patterns of change.
The Limits of a Low-Proﬁle Instrument: New Facets of the Wages 
Issue Since 1988
Despite some success, the extensive use of the RMS as a lever for the
policy of economic stringency was a low-proﬁle public policy whose
inconveniences and limitations came clearly to light during the 1990s. In
many ways, the robustness of the instrument—which guarantees its efﬁ-
ciency—also has important drawbacks, by its very nature and because it
creates instrument dependency. Brieﬂy, three mechanisms may be high-
lighted that perfectly exemplify the structuring inﬂuence of some charac-
teristics of the RMS, as well as the intrinsic limits of its use.
First, both the focus on the wages instrument and its low-proﬁle use
had negative effects in the medium term. The choice of a decremental
policy on wages was more easily reversible and led to no long-term
structural change. This low-proﬁle public policy therefore remained sub-
ject to changes in the budgetary context as well as to political cycles
(changes in government or of policy direction). The mechanism was effec-
tive in the 1980s, but it was based exclusively on the Budget Directorate’s
actions and was therefore dependent on the legitimacy of its interventions.
In 1987, as it was being institutionalized, the RMS was also publicized
and even publicly claimed by politicians to explain that civil servants’
purchasing power had not diminished in 1986 and would not diminish
in 1987. From then on, publicity surrounding methods of economic strin-
gency started to limit their political effectiveness, crystallizing opposition
to them. At that period, the advent of a more favorable economic context
relaxed budgetary constraints and reduced the instrument’s legitimacy.
As economic stringency became less legitimate, there was renewed dis-
satisfaction with the negative effects of economic policy. Signiﬁcantly, in
1988, in the political aftermath of the presidential elections, strikes, and
social movements spread throughout the civil service and public enter-
prises: their common denominator was the demand for civil service wage
uprating, characterized as catching up after years of economic stringency
initiated by the Socialist Left itself.
In this period, Prime Minister Michel Rocard’s government took
responsibility for another approach to the administrative issue, running
counter to the Budget Directorate’s preferred options (Bezes 2001). The
two pillars of the policy of economic stringency (wages and workforce
numbers) were totally reconstructed in the context of a return to growth
and a considerable increase in ﬁscal receipts. An advantageous wage
agreement was negotiated and signed (November 16, 1988), as was a
broader reform of the civil service wage structure (the Durafour Agree-
ments, February 9, 1990) that readjusted the pay scales of low-paid cate-
gories B, C, and D. To relax the effects of economic stringency, the Rocard
government found itself engaged in corporatist strategies, using category
increases in the form of bonuses for certain groups of public employees
(teachers, nurses, court clerks, social services inspectors, etc.). In this
context, the instrument revealed the limits of its adaptability, with dis-
crepancies emerging in its intrinsic, solid properties. Further civil service
wage agreements (November 9, 1993, signed by the government of Prime
Minister Edouard Balladur, and February 10, 1998, signed by the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin) were embedded in the same con-
straints. Sensitive electoral contexts led governments to conduct
successive negotiations without declaring the use of the RMS. The agree-
ment of February 10, 1998 was ofﬁcially negotiated on the previous basis
of year-on-year level, taking into account only the value of the standard
civil service salary point. This agreement was viewed by the Budget
Directorate as costly; no other general agreement has been made since
1998. Negotiations failed in 2005, only serving to conﬁrm disagreement
between civil service unions and public authorities.
There is a second bunch of limitations resulting from the effects of
intensive use of the RMS. An inconvenience created by the RMS related
to the fact that it led to compensating category increases, in the form of
bonuses, to correct the absence of general increases in the salary point.
This use of bonuses, “arranged” by the state because they do not apply
to payment of retirement pensions, destroyed the wage hierarchy and, in
the long run, emphasized the fall in the wages replacement rate of pen-
sions. Moreover, as Daniel has stated, although individual living stan-
dards for state employees were maintained, wage control measures found
expression in the substantially wider gap between public sector wages
and private sector wages, particularly for senior managers in the civil
service (Daniel 1992). Over the period, limiting wages by inﬂating the
GVT effect was shown to be counterproductive. The fall in the number of
candidates competing for entry to the civil service—in general, and to the
Ecole nationale d’Administration in particular (Garrigou 2001)—may be
interpreted as a perverse effect of restrictive wages policy. Finally, to these
effects must be added the eventual exhaustion of the deﬂationary effect
of the RMS and its limited capacity, on its own, to reduce personnel
expenditure. First, in theory, in the absence of inﬂation—as in the 1990s—
the automatic effects of GVT alone are enough in themselves to maintain
civil servants’ purchasing power. A tool of competitive disinﬂation, the
RMS is no longer of any use when the objective of low inﬂation has been
achieved. Second, in the context of recurrent budgetary crises (1993–1994
or 2002–2003), the low-proﬁle wages instrument seemed too limited in its
concrete ability to reduce the state’s personnel expenditure. This brought
about a change in approach that occurred in the late 1990s. The issue was
not so much a matter of acting to reduce wages directly (and thus increase
disaffection in the civil service) but a question of reducing staff numbers:
this alone would lead to a real diminution in state expenditure, while still
allowing wages to be uprated.
The third limitation of the low-proﬁle wages policy relates to its
intrinsically confrontational structure. There have been controversies
around using the RMS and GVT to calculate growth in civil servants’
purchasing power since the late 1980s, and these have been increas-
ingly accentuated. In outline, they are based on the structure of the bal-
ance of power established in the 1970s, which placed the Budget
Directorate and the trade unions in opposing camps. This conﬁrms the
idea of an instrument dependency, that is, the limitations deriving from
reiterated manipulation and adaptability of a technical tool with intrin-
sic properties. The structuring effects of using the RMS and GVT
(asymmetry of information, complex calculations and debates, the
monopoly established by the Budget Directorate, trade union hostility)
remained constant throughout the 1990s. In fact, the gulf between the
public authorities and the civil service trade unions became even
deeper. On the one hand, the RMS continued to be used in the argu-
ments of the public, administrative, and parliamentary authorities. It
was very successful as a legitimate learning instrument, as is evidenced
by budget documents on personnel expenditure, by reports of parlia-
mentary task forces on the civil service and by administrative reports
from the Civil Service Ministry, the Budget Directorate, and the
National Planning Commission. Concepts and mechanisms characteris-
tic of the RMS—notably relating to the effects of GVT—were assimi-
lated by senior civil servants and elected ofﬁcials, and formed the basis
for the thinking of political and administrative experts. On the other
hand, and in contrast, most of the civil service trade unions rejected
the overall calculation based on the wage bill and denounced its harm-
ful effects on civil servants’ purchasing power. They presented the
RMS and GVT as “daylight robbery.”
Thus, the RMS instrument was associated structurally with a strong
institutional opposition, making any policy based on social dialogue dif-
ﬁcult. On several occasions since the late 1980s, initiatives have been
taken to rationalize the method of calculation, focusing on the aim of
getting the trade unions to accept the RMS, in order to try and make a
true negotiated civil service policy possible. In 1988, a task force was
created, charged with formulating proposals for a renewal of wage nego-
tiations in the civil service (Guilhamon 1989). It pointed out the negative
effects of the low-proﬁle policy centered on the RMS and GVT, the hos-
tility of civil service trade unions, their disagreements with the public
authorities over calculation methods, and the freezing of all collective
negotiations. The Budget Directorate’s whole strategy was implicitly crit-
icized. The recommendations argued for greater publicity and transpar-
ency in the terms of negotiation, for a better deﬁnition of the measurement
indicators (centered on growth in the average pay of a group of natural
persons present over the period), and for a real comparison with the
private sector in order to ensure that the civil service was not disadvan-
taged. The stated aim of “restoring social dialogue” in the context of
“public service renewal” echoed the criticisms directed at the low-proﬁle
use of the RMS and its delegitimization in the late 1980s. Very recently, in
February 2004, the issues linked to GVT were taken up again in similar
terms, in the context of a debate on overhauling the wage negotiation
rules.17 The question of the “methodological framework for wage negoti-
ation” was raised again. The Civil Service Minister, Jean-Paul Delevoye,
then proposed to set up a “pay observatory” responsible for “creating an
objective, shared statistical base.” The seven civil service trade unions
denounced the idea, and this led to the project’s failure. On this point, the
terms of the debate recall exchanges in the mid-1960s, in which govern-
ment and trade unions were opposed. The tension between the three
intrinsic properties of the RMS—a tool for acquiring knowledge, an
instrument of spending control, and an element in stabilizing the terms
of social dialogue—remains, sustaining both contradictions and conﬂicts.
New Strategies for Retrenching Civil Service Wages Expenditure at 
the Turn of the Century
At the end of the century, in a context where public expenditure still
remained a crucial issue, the strategy of decreasing civil service wages by
“working within the existing framework” (Hacker 2005) with a low-
proﬁle instrument appeared ineffective. At this time, both other “internal”
and stronger “external” strategies were developed. First, the demo-
graphic analysis of civil service population trends provided evidence for
stronger initiatives on the overall public sector personnel system. In 2000,
the Commissariat général au Plan published an alarming report on public
employment trends which revealed that 720,000 public servants will be
retired from the state civil service by 2012—that is, 45% of all state
employees (Commissariat Général du Plan 2000). The report presented
this macroevolution as a historic opportunity for the French state to make
hard choices about its personnel management and recruitment strategy,
both in quantitative terms (do policy makers need to replace every public
servant?) and in qualitative terms (if recruitment is necessary, what
should the priorities be?). These ﬁgures were made public, and they
transformed Budget Directorate and government strategies on personnel
policies. The governments of both Prime Minister Jospin and Prime Min-
ister Raffarin announced they would stabilize the overall number of staff
by balancing out retirement departures and new recruitment. The Budget
Directorate asserted its objective of not replacing one retired public ser-
vant in two, and this now frames all negotiations with ministries. This
nonreplacement strategy—that is, an approach that delegitimizes and
blocks any compensatory interventions (in this case, recruitment) in the
face of major shifts in environment—is termed “drift” by Jacob S. Hacker
in his analysis of the hidden politics of social policy reform (Hacker 2005).
At the same time, the core idea of the RMS (to take into account the
overall wage bill) has been reframed within a big “external” legislative
change, and its ubiquity thus reinforced. Indeed, the passage of a new
Institutional Act on Budget Legislation, adopted on August 1, 2001,
retained the main signiﬁcance of the RMS, while encapsulating it in a
broader, rationalized legislative framework. The Act, to be implemented
by 2006, set up a results-oriented budget, redesigning the overall budget
architecture by organizing credit items into 34 assignment groups and 132
programs, each a consistent set of measures coming under the same
ministry and involving both speciﬁc objectives and expected results that
would be subject to review. Within each program, public managers will
be given a great deal of room to maneuver in the use of appropriations
allocated to them, with stronger freedom to redistribute these appropria-
tions between types of expenditure (with the exception of topping up
personnel appropriations from other appropriations—so-called “asym-
metric fungibility”). A wage bill ceiling and a jobs ceiling were to be
deﬁned for each program and for each ministry, detailing jobs on the state
payroll. These new global frameworks require demanding overall wage
bill measurement at every level, along with forecasts that will optimize
the management of each ministry’s total wage bill.
The Hidden Politics of Administrative Change: What a Low-Proﬁle 
Instrument Tells Us about the Transformation of Bureaucracies
For those interested in institutional changes in administrative systems,
this case study demonstrates three signiﬁcant arguments about retrench-
ment policies that use low-proﬁle instruments.
Why Instruments Matter: A Concrete View of Administrative Changes
First, through this case study, emphasis has been placed on the salience
of techniques for calculating, measuring, classifying, and indexing, linked
to the construction of reliable information on the activities of contempo-
rary government. An examination of how the RMS was invented and
perfected throws a spotlight on the importance of knowledge as stakes in
administrative reform. The attention paid to the “administrative popula-
tion,” from the two perspectives of number (the size of the workforce)
and—especially—budgeting (the size of the wage bill) requires technical
devices to provide knowledge of the number of public employees and a
precise measure of their demands on state expenditure. The conditions in
which this measuring tool was created and used—and the knowledge
issues related to them—illustrate the importance of a technocratic per-
spective (Weaver 1989) that raises the value of techniques in administra-
tive policy as a way of rationalizing policy making and providing a
predictable and “objective” mode of civil service wages calculation. The
instrument matters all the more as measurement, once launched and
“backed by powerful institutions,” becomes “real, fateful and autono-
mous” (Espeland and Stevens 1998, 325). Seemingly, the RMS may be
viewed as a neutral instrument showing the various components of the
overall civil service wage bill. Once such a mode of calculation was
institutionalized, it became extremely robust but also, paradoxically,
adaptable to different policy aims. Initially viewed as an instrument for
learning in a context where the rationality of the state was being ques-
tioned, the RMS then came to be seen as a possible foundation for trust
in a Keynesian-inspired incomes policy, before ﬁnally being used as a
crucial tool in imposing economic stringency. In all cases, the instrument
provides new capacities for government interventions by creating new
“objective” realities. By allowing itself to become an object of investiga-
tion through the RMS, administration also becomes an object of public
intervention (because the public authorities may then want to act on
whatever the instrument has categorized and highlighted). However, as
nicely illustrated by the RMS, an instrument also refracts power relations.
Although the RMS—like all measurement instruments—has “produced
depersonalised, public forms of knowledge” (Espeland and Stevens
1998), it is not uncontroversial. The categorizations and methods of cal-
culation that form the basis of wage increase mechanisms were discussed
and contested, from the late 1960s, to the point where long-lasting
opposed positions crystallized. The second and fourth parts of this article
have analyzed the controversies of the 1970s and 1990s around the RMS,
privileging the conﬂict that brought trade unions and employers (neither
of whom recognized the scientiﬁc robustness or the legitimacy of the
RMS) into opposition with the Budget Directorate of the Ministry of
Finance.
The Low-Proﬁle Art of Government: Depoliticized Techniques in 
Politics and the Politicized Use of Depoliticization
The second message of this article is to emphasize the important part
played in the art of government, since the 1970s, by governing through
automatic, unobtrusive, incremental, low-proﬁle mechanisms at times of
economic crisis (Weaver 1986, 1988, 1989). Starting from the late 1970s and
continuing until the late 1980s, the RMS gradually became an unobtrusive
strategic instrument in the policy of civil service expenditure reduction.
Its low-proﬁle dimension relies on two elements. First, the method of
calculation, its technical nature, and the statistical realities it constructs
made the RMS a particularly depoliticized instrument for rationalizing
civil service wages policy. The instrument’s constituent properties created
possibilities for automatic wages policy adjustment. The RMS relied
simultaneously on increasing the complexity of the formulae for calculat-
ing pay increases, on decrementally decreasing the sum that could be
negotiated with the social partners, and on introducing an automatic
mechanism for reducing this sum. In particular, the new equation deﬁn-
ing the calculation based on the wage bill and integrating GVT introduced
a mechanism for the automatic reduction of the annually negotiable part
of public sector employees’ purchasing power (the general increases),
limiting gains made through a parallel mechanism for increasing the
structural part of this same purchasing power (via GVT). This picture
therefore accords a great deal of importance to inﬂationary automatic
mechanisms, which it implicitly criticizes. Second, the low-proﬁle dimen-
sion of the RMS came from the strategic and political uses of the instru-
ment and especially from its monopolization by the Budget Directorate
in wage negotiations with the trade unions. The RMS met the expectations
of those who implemented it, both through its dual impact (reducing
public spending and limiting wage increases to help force down inﬂation)
and through its political beneﬁts: reducing the scope of political conﬂicts
by concealing civil service wages stagnation or even decreases. In relation
to the civil service, the Mauroy and Fabius governments were “blame
minimizers,” looking for mechanisms to enable them to obtain the desired
result while avoiding shouldering the blame (Weaver 1986)—that is, to
reduce both the concentrated costs of a public policy and the risks of
imputation. The Budget Directorate offered a technical, complex, asym-
metric solution that made this low-proﬁle action possible; it was also in
a position, through its networks, to get the instrument accepted politically
and impose its use in the context of wage negotiations. The instrument
allowed the development of a budgetary policy of retrenchment while
minimizing its political costs (Pierson 1994).
This throws light on a set of practices that do not deﬁne public admin-
istrative reforms so much as they reveal the art of governing bureaucracy
through “low-proﬁle instruments.” This softly-softly approach is an inten-
tional strategy, on a similar footing to the tactics whereby governments
render their actions “opaque” when they are worried about the visibility
of policies that reduce accrued advantages or social beneﬁts and so might
lead to electoral sanctions (Pierson 1994). Several factors explain the “suc-
cess” of this art in the case of the RMS. The incremental adoption of the
instrument made opposition hard to organize because the successive
steps taken were small, not very visible, and in themselves represented
only slight variations. It was also difﬁcult to oppose the strategy of the
Budget Directorate and the government. In 1982–1984, the economic con-
text of crisis did not put the civil service unions in a position of power,
and they could not really oppose a policy of economic stringency that
demanded they contribute to the national effort. Further, the complexity
of the calculation, the difﬁculty of gaining access to the information it was
based on, and the low-proﬁle mode of action adopted all made it hard to
build on the weak mobilization against ofﬁcial use of the RMS. Finally,
the public authorities played on divisions between its opponents. Some
trade unions agreed to talk on the basis of the RMS and accepted these
frameworks as a basis for negotiation. Winning one trade union actor over
to the cognitive frameworks imposed by the Budget Directorate weak-
ened protest and gave credence to the “truth” of the RMS. The trade
unions’ difﬁculties in creating a real collective opposition to the new
calculation reinforced the instrument’s success during the 1980s.
Overall, this case study of the different faces of the RMS has helped us
to consider the complex process of low-proﬁle government, which relies
both on the need for more expert information and on its manipulation for
political reasons. This case suggests that depoliticization and politiciza-
tion processes may be more intricately intertwined than is usually
observed (for a convergent argument, see Flinders and Buller 2005).
Administrative Changes in Scope and Time: New Scales for Observing 
and Explaining Retrenchment in Bureaucracies
The third concluding observation to be made focuses on the kind of
changes emphasized by the instrument approach. While most studies of
administrative reforms to some extent highlight public policies that target
the structures and rules of bureaucracies, the case of the RMS allows us
to observe “everyday forms of retrenchment” (Hacker 2005)—that is,
internal but signiﬁcant shifts in administrative systems without formal
revision. The changes induced by the “low-proﬁle” instrument were both
incremental and at the margin (such as the use of an “equation” in nego-
tiations). Compared to budgetary and administrative reform policies in
other countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000), the French orientation before
2001 was weaker in aims and scope and was strategically preferred to
more comprehensive, more public reforms of structures and rules that
would have been more costly for elected politicians. However, the pur-
poses and the effects of this strategy were of paramount importance for
the French administrative system. The introduction of the RMS expressed
the change in general objectives on state expenditure. It was a matter of
seeking to reduce the drain on the GDP of public administration, and
particularly of the state, especially in terms of the wage bill. Changing the
method of determining wage growth transformed the way in which civil
servants’ purchasing power was guaranteed. Until the 1970s, it had been
a question of guaranteeing year-on-year maintenance of the purchasing
power of the civil service salary point; now it became merely a matter of
maintaining, in inﬂation-adjusted francs, the overall amount of the wage
bill for a workforce viewed as unchanged in size. Thus, the adoption, in
1985, of “RMS + GVT” strategies no longer ensured a general increase in
all wages nor an annual progression by salary point value, previously
viewed as a vested right. The concept of average purchasing power was
imposed, and broke the automatic wage increase mechanism. Between
1982 and 1988, therefore, the terms of civil service wages policy were
profoundly challenged, with the ending of indexation, the public display
of a new method for calculating growth in the wage bill, and the steady
reduction of the general increase negotiable annually with civil servants.
From this point on, the RMS instrument, formerly used within the Key-
nesian framework of an incomes policy, was at the service of a neoliberal
policy of retrenchment and of a strong challenge to the historical arrange-
ments of the French administration. Focusing on the instrument provides
evidence that major administrative policy departures can occur through
other routes than big, highly public reforms.
This brings us to a last, important argument concerning the temporal
dimension of policy changes (for a broad view, see Pierson 2004). Tracing
the historical life of a low-proﬁle instrument permits us to bring to light
sequences over time other than those relating directly to public policies.
During the 1980s, a “low-proﬁle” tool for staff expenditures was devel-
oped as an alternative to the development of a “public” policy with
retrenchment objectives. It acted as a crosscutting constraint on the emer-
gence of more structural, managerialist, or drastic cutback initiatives on
the French administration. To some extent, the excessive focus on the RMS
instrument and its efﬁciency limited—for a while—the Budget Director-
ate’s quest for managerial tools or structural reforms. This conﬁrms the
view, supported by Orren and Skowronek (1993), that an “institutional
order” is made up of separate, interacting institutions that “juxtapose
different logics of political order, each with their own temporal underpin-
nings,” “operating according to distinctive ordering principles” (Orren
and Skowronek 1993, 320). These various elements “structure the passage
of time—the sequences and cycles, the changes and lulls—at varying
rates.” The case of the RMS has illustrated that the dynamics of the low-
proﬁle instrument had its own logic and timing, which affected the par-
allel logic of public administrative reform. Both have their speciﬁc stories
and narratives, but I have chosen to emphasize how the instrument
approach can help to trace new paths of institutional development. By
pointing up the importance of different temporalities in the government
of bureaucracy, we suggest that the interplay and possible overlap
between the dynamics of instrument and the dynamics of public policy
need further exploration, in order to pinpoint the multiple forms of
retrenchment that affect bureaucracy.
Notes
1. These are the initiatives that gave rise to the Rationalisation des Choix
Budgétaires, the French version of the US Planning, Programming and Bud-
geting System.
2. The public sector enterprises covered in the report are limited to four: the
railways (S.N.C.F.), Electricité et Gaz de France, coal mining (Charbonnages de
France), and Parisian transport (R.A.T.P.).
3. This automatic effect will be referred to as “GVT” (Glissement Vieillesse
Technicité).
4. In 1964, the trade unions complained about this attempt to impose uniform
wage increases both on public enterprises and on the civil service (Hayward
1966, 187).
5. National Accounts in Statistiques et Etudes Financières. 1982/3. No 388.
6. The numerical data relating to growth in public spending and especially to
debt reveal a less unfavorable situation in France than in a good number of
other countries at the same period—a factor that cannot have encouraged
the government to implement or publicize drastic budgetary policies.
7. Information based on interviews with former members of the Budget
Directorate.
8. The equation “WB = GI + CI + GVT” where PI = Prices increase; WBI =
wages bill increase; GI = general increases (i.e., increases negotiated annu-
ally between the civil service trade unions and the government);
CI = category increases (i.e., the sum of measures that apply to only one
group, corps, or category); GVT: Glissement Vieillesse Technicité = the effects
of automatic growth of the wage bill by taking into account promotion by
seniority and changes in technical expertise requirements.
9. Until 1977, the maintenance of purchasing power was ofﬁcially calculated
using the levels of the civil service salary point: the value of the reference
point used to calculate civil servants’ wages in December of year n was the
value in December n–1multiplied by the year-on-year growth rate of the
INSEE prices index.
10. Demanding a 6% wage increase by level is less speciﬁc than demanding an
increase of 6% calculated on the basis of the wage bill.
11. The ﬁrst manifestation symbolic of this change was that standards were set
to try to limit spending growth and restrict the level of deﬁcits: in March
1982—on the initiative of the French president, in consultation with minis-
ters—a limiting threshold for the budget deﬁcit of 3% GDP was established
publicly. This decision is dated to February 2, 1982 in Favier and Martin-
Rolland (1990, 496).
12. These phases were identiﬁed through comparison of three types of data:
information gathered during our interviews with members of the Budget
Directorate at the period and with some of the trade unionists involved in
the negotiations, extremely precise trade union accounts written later (in
particular, Bidouze 1995; Branciard 1995), and general articles on civil ser-
vice wages policy (Daniel 1992).
13. Up to 1984–1985, the amount of GVT had been calculated on an inclusive
basis and it represented the assessed “GVT balance”—that is, a wage bill
calculated from growth in the average per capita wage for the permanent
workforce (in the jargon of the Budget Directorate, the salaire moyen par
tête, or SMPT), by integrating the structural variations in the population
studied and by taking into account the two component mechanisms of
GVT: the effect of the positive impact on the wage bill of promotion by
length of service, by selection or by rank and the acquisition of new tech-
nical expertise (known as “positive GVT”), and the shuttle effect (or “neg-
ative GVT”) which shows the generally negative impact on the wage bill
of the interplay between workforce entries and exits. “GVT balance”
therefore represented a relatively moderate amount because the shuttle
effect signiﬁcantly attenuated increases caused by the career effect, taking
into account retirement and the recruitment of young employees paid less
than those who leave, thus reducing the wage bill. By recruiting young
people, private enterprise and the civil service helped to increasing the
overall wage budget to be negotiated because, in doing so, they reduced
the amount of GVT.
14. INSEE was opposed to other methods of calculation, but in 1986, the legit-
imacy and power of the Budget Directorate prevailed.
15. It was therefore necessary to neutralize the effects of negative GVT (entries
and exits) and take into account only positive GVT.
16. Sources: Les Notes bleues de Bercy [Ministry of Finance Bulletin of News, Facts
and Figures]. 1991 Finance Bill. NB 508. October 1–7, 1990.
17. Second roundtable discussions with the civil service trade unions on the
subject of renewing social dialogue, Thursday, January 27, 2004.
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